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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING 
co., a corporation, and WYOMING 
MINERAL CORPORATION, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
INTRODUCTION 
BRIEF IN ANSWER TO 
PETITION FOR RDBNli.O 
Case No. 16209 
Plaintiff/Appellant Allen-Howe Specialties Corp.'s ("Appellant•) 
Petition for Rehearing is improper because 1) the ar~ta are 
improperly raised at this late date; 2) the arguments were not 
overlooked in this court's Opinion of April 21, 1980; and, 3) 
Appellant's arguments fail on their merits. Each of these points 
will be treated below. 
Appellant's Facts are essentially correct, except in its 
failure to note that the arguments now made by Appellant were 
raised for the first time in its Reply Brief on appeal. Further, 
Appellant too narrowly construes this Court's Opinion of April 21, 
1980 as relying only on the five day notice provision, instead of 
both non-compliance with the five day notice provision and the 
presence of a no damage for delay clause. 
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I. 
ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Tbe Appellant bas lost its opportunity to have these issues 
coa.idered by this Court. The Appellant originally filed this 
Action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake county, 
State of Utah, on December 15, 1977. In connection with its clau 
for additional compensation, Appellant alleged in its Count II as 
followe: 
14. Pursuant to its contract with u.s. 
Construction, Inc., together with extras, 
plaintiff performed labor and furnished 
materials in the amount of $128,302.42 of 
which amount u.s. Construction, Inc. has 
paid $53,292.00, leaving a balance due of 
$75,010.42. (R4) 
Aa is apparent from its Petition for Rehearing, Appellant now 
seeks compensation not for "extras", as alleged in its Complaint, 
but rather for interference. In addition, at no point in its 
original complaint did Appellant allege that any provision of 
the contract had been waived by U.S. Construction or any agent 
of U.S. Construction. 
The Defendants moved for a Summary Judgment in the Fall of 
1978. At that time, Defendants fully set forth their argument 
concerning Plaintiff being barred from any relief by contract 
provisions. (R.102- 104). In its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Appellant did not, in 
any form, raise the arguments it now raises in its Petition for 
Rehearing. (See Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Mot1on 
for Summary Judgment, R.l46 - 165). 
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Neither did Appellant raise these issues in its •arief of 
Appellant" filed with this Court on appeal. 
The arguments were first raised by the Appellants in its 
Reply Brief, at a time when Defendants had neither an oppor-
tunity to object to the issues being suddenly raised, nor an 
opportunity to respond to those arguments. 
Since this waiver argument was neither pled nor argued at 
the trial level below, the Supreme Court need not now consider 
the argument. As this Court held in wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 
366, 482 P.2d 704, 705 (1971): 
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor 
put in issue at the trial cannot be con-
sidered for the first time on appeal. 
In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation 
this court held that a party may not inject 
a new doctrine upon which to predicate 
liability for the first time on appeal. 
This court stated: 
... Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose 
is the final settlement of controversies, 
requires that a party must present his 
entire case and his theory or theories of 
recovery to the trial court; and having done 
so, he cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to keep in 
motion a merry-go-round of litigation. 
Appellants improperly raised these arguments for the first 
time in its Reply Brief. Appellants now seek to obtain a 
rehearing based on issues which were not properly before this 
Court on appeal. on that basis alone, the Petition for Rehearing 
should be rejected. The Appellant is not entitled to raise new 
1ssues at each successive stage of litigation. 
-3-
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II. 
T.BB APRIL 21, 1980 OPINION OVERLOOKS NO ISSUE. 
In it8 Petition for Rehearing the Appellant incorrectly 
contenda that this Court overlooked its "waiver" argument con-
cerninq the five day notice provision. The Appellant is wronq. 
~· Court's Opinion of April 21, 1980 specifically held that: 
All of the invoices submitted by plaintiff 
to u.s.c. were beyond the five-day limitation 
period set forth in the foregoing provision; so 
any claim of u.s.c. against the owner for alleged 
interference would be deemed waived. Furthermore, 
plaintiff attributed some of the problems of 
interference on the congested building site to 
initial delays in the project caused by rain. 
The contract between omin and u.s.c. s eci-
1Ca ~ prec udes any cla1m for add1t1onal com-
pensat1on or damages by reason of any delay. 
since there is no basis for u.s.c. to claim 
damages or additional compensation from Wyoming 
on the claims asserted by plaintiff, plaintiff is 
not entitled under the provisions of Section 6 of 
its contract to an increase in the subcontract 
price, or damages for delay, or interference 
caused by the acts of the owner, contractor or 
other subcontractors. (Page 4, Slip Opinion) 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Inherent in the above holding is a rejection of the Appell~t 
arguments. The Court was entitled to conclude in its April 21, 
1980 Opinion that neither the record nor the law supports the 
Appellant's arguments. This Court is not bound to address each 
and every minor argument raised in the Briefs of the parties. 
Rather, a holding such as the Court issued in this case encom-
passes an implicit rejection of the arguments now raised. 
In any event, the Court's holding has two bases. First, 
claims for interference must be submitted within five days of tl.t 
-4-
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occurrence; and, second, Appellant is entitled to no daaagea 
caused by the delay relating to the interference. That boldiDg 
bars Appellant's present arguments. 
III. 
APPELLANT' S ARGUMENTS FAIL ON THEIR MERITS 
Appellant's argument is broken into two parta: Firat, tbat 
the allowance of compensation for damages caused Appellant bJ a 
collision between its crane and a Jacob's Engineering crane 
waived the five day notice provision; and, second, that an offer 
for a novation of the contract from Appellant dated August 8, 1977 
was somehow compliance with the five day notice provision for tbe 
remaining performance under the contract. 
The latter argument is nonsensical. The August 8, 1977 
document is entitled "Proposal" and is coached in terms of a 
complete renegotiation of the contract between u.s. Construction 
and Appellant. (R. 237, D-12). Further, it is entitled "Request 
for Extra Work Authorization and Extension of Time." Id. Appellant 
now contends, however, that it seeks compensation for interference, 
not for extra work. In fact, if the request was for extra work, 
it was specifically rejected, as is indicated on R. 237, D-12, and 
is therefore of no assistance to Appellant. 
Finally, paragraph 9 of the contract between Wyoming Minerals 
and u.s. Construction, which this Court has held governs the 
Appellant, provides that 
-5-
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• . . Any claim of the Contractor arising out 
of any alleged interference due to the conduct 
of such other work shall be made to the Owner 
in writing within five (5) days of the occur-
rence of the alleged interference and shall 
be deemed to have been waived unless so made. 
Clearly, paragraph 9 of that contract requires submission of a 
request ~ the interference. Appellant urges this court to 
allow it to redraft that provision to allow submission of one 
request for all hypothetical, prospective interference. Appel-
lant's argument is that this Court should reject and redraft 
unambiguous contract language. That argument was rejected by 
this Court in its April 21, 1980 Opinion. 
Appellant devotes greater attention to its waiver argument. 
Appellant argues that the grant of compensation (R. 237, D-27) 
for an alleged occurrence of interference in July constituted a 
waiver of the five day notice provision. That compensation was 
not approved until the latter part of September, 1977. (R. 237, 
D-27). From that document, and a preceding meeting, Appellant 
argues that there has been a retroactive waiver of the five day 
notice provision for all prior invoices relating to interference. 
Appellant's argument must be rejected. 
As correctly stated in Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, 
a waiver requires, "an existing right, benefit or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." 
Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1294 (Utah 1978). The right 
here in question was that u.s. Construction need only consider 
claims for interference subrnltted wlthin flve days of the occur-
rene~. As is clear from the record, u.S. Constructlon unl forml; 
-6-
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exercised that right throughout Appellant's perforaance.l Tbe 
only deviation took place when one claim was granted, after all 
others were rejected. Neither Sandberg nor the other caaea cited 
by Appellant, Vitra-Spray of Florida v. Gumenick, 144 so. 24 533 
(Fla. App 1962) and Rivercliff Co. v. Linebarger, 233 Ark. 105, 
264 s.w. 2d 842, cert. den., 348 u.s. 834 (1954) stand for aucb 
a retroactive waiver. Appellant's own behavior, in a~tting 
claims for interference in the same format throughout ita per-
formance, illustrates that it did not believe that any ... ting, 
or grant of a particular claim, waived any right of U.S. Construction. 
u.s. Construction uniformly enforced its right to reject untimely 
claims before and after the August 22, 1977 meeting. (See footnote 
1). No "intentional relinquishment of a known right" can be 
1nferred from u.s. construction's actions. 
Broad public policy reasons mitigate against implying any 
across the board waiver because of the August 22, 1977 meeting or 
approval of the crane claim. This Court would seriously impede 
settlement of disputed matters if, in doing so, a person risks 
compromising prior claim rejections. In a similar case, the 
court in sam Finley, Inc. v. Pilcher, Livingston and Wallace, Inc., 
314 F. Supp. 654, 655 (S.D. Ga. 1970), a Miller Act suit by a 
1Requests for compensation for interference, in the form of 
invoices, and dated as follows, were rejected by U.S. Construct1on: 
June 29, 1977 (R. 237, D-9); July 28, 1977 (R. 237, D-10); August 8, 
1977 (R. 237, D-11); August 29, 1977 (R. 237, 0-21); August 31, 
1977 (R. 237, o-22); and September 12, 1977 (R. 237, D-26). The 
September 6, 1977 invoice (R. 237, D-24), was the last request for 
additlonal compensations submitted by the Appellant that appears 
~n the present record. 
-7-
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aaterialaaD against a general contractor and the general con-
tractor'• •urety, held that negotiation by defendants with plain-
tiff concerning settlement of a dispute did not constitute a waiv~ 
by defendants of the one year statute of limitations. Similarly, 
in carpenter International, Inc. v. Kaiser Jamaica Corp., 393 F. 
Supp. 396 (D. Del. 1975) the Court rejected a waiver argument made 
by a contractor based on a settlement meeting held to discuss the 
contractor's claims. This Court should not prejudice the Respondet'. 
for their attempts to amicably settle portions of the Appellant's 
claim by discussing those claims at the August 22, 1977 meeting 
nor by granting one of many different requests subsequent thereto 
Finally, Appellant makes much of the idea that it was "lullec 
into believing its claims would be granted in full after the 
August 22. 1977 meeting. Invoices submitted subsequent thereto, 
however, completely belie that contention. Specifically, Appell~ 
contends that "had plaintiff been told that its claims were 
untimely, plaintiff could either have ceased work, or have sub-
mitted claims on a daily basis after August 22." After the 
August 22 meeting, an invoice for work during the week of August. 
1977 was submitted. (R. 237, D-23). On August 31, 1977 an 
invoice was submitted for the week of August 22, 1977, detailing 
the equipment and labor for August 22, 23, 24, and 25. (R. 237, :· 
22). On September 6, 1977 an invoice was submitted for the week 
of August 29, 1977, detailing equipment and labor for August 29. 
30, 31 and September 1 and 2. (R. 237, D-24). A rev1ew of the 
record shows that Appellant acted no d1fferently after the Augus: 
-8-
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22 meeting than it did before. After, as before, the Appellant 
continued to submit claims for interference which failed to 
comply with the contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has raised no valid ground for granting ita Petition 
for Rehearing. The matters now raised are not properly before this 
Court since Appellant failed to properly raise the issues in the 
lower court. Further, this Court fully considered all matters in 
its previous Opinion which are now raised by the Appellant. Finally, 
Appellant's argument is unsupported by the record and is contrary 
to appropriate policy and the applicable law. 
DATED this ~ day of May, 1980. 
I . 
L/\?1~ 
-9-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 1980, 1 de-
livered two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF IN 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING to Peter W. Billings, Warren 
Patten and Charles B. Casper, of and for Fabian & Clendenin, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 800 continental Bank Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101. 
( 
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